The Globe printed my letter to the editor

It’s available here:

http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/letters/articles/2009/11/09/kerry_sees_success_hinges_on_more_than_troop_levels/

It came off a little more high-handed than I meant it to, but Vennochi’s column upset me. You can read her column here:

http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/10/29/on_afghan_war_pick_a_side/

As Spencer Ackerman says, “history just has a way of kicking John Kerry in the teeth”. He gets stuck with thankless tasks like running for president, drafting climate legislation, and jawboning Hamid Karzai. The last thing he needs is pundits telling him that his stance on Afghanistan has to be reducible to “Yes!” or “No!”.

Week in Review, 11/2-11/8

If there was ever a week where events conspired to push Afghanistan out of the headlines, this was it. First the Fort Hood tragedy, and then Saturday’s health care vote, occupied our political media this week, sidelining the aftermath of Dr. Abdullah’s withdrawal from the runoff election.

After deliberating briefly, the Independent Electoral Commission cancelled the second vote and declared Hamid Karzai president-elect on Monday, the day after Abdullah’s announcement. The Post describes the “collective sigh of relief” in Kabul, accompanied by “celebratory text messages” and honking horns, as it became clear that the country wouldn’t be subjected to a second round of polls.

President Obama was quick to make hay out of the announcement, using his congratulatory phone call to Karzai to deliver a lecture on the importance of cracking down on corruption. Karzai, of course, has been making eager noises about doing so, but has been unwilling to get specific. His victory press conference was heavy on references to corruption, but check out this quote: “These problems cannot be solved by changing high-ranking officials. We’ll review the laws and see what problems are in the law, and we will draft some new laws.” That hardly sounds like the zeal of a reformer. And when U.N. envoy Kai Eide called for an end to the “culture of impunity” at a press conference, the Afghan Foreign Ministry issued a stern statement equating Eide’s words with “issuing instructions concerning the composition of Afghan government”, which they termed a violation of sovereignty.

What Obama and his allies want, as one European diplomat said, is “a couple of high-profile heads on a platter”. (One of those “heads”, that of Mohammed Qasim Fahim, was flanking Karzai during his press conference. Another, that of Abdul Rashid Dostum, arrived in Afghanistan for unexplained reasons on Monday night.) Admiral Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wants to see some prosecutions of corrupt officials, and Gordon Brown hit basically the same notes in a speech on Friday, claiming that he wouldn’t put British troops “in harm’s way for a government that does not stand up against corruption”. To give Karzai a nudge in the right direction, the U.S. and its allies are drafting a “compact” for Afghanistan, according to McClatchy, that lays out some of the specific reforms they’d like Karzai to implement, such as ceding more authority to the provinces.

Whatever is going on in private, the American government’s public response to the election debacle continues to be inconsistent and occasionally farcical. Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, for example, twisted himself in knots denying that the Afghan government has a legitimacy problem. Hillary Clinton became the latest American official to hedge her bets by speaking of the U.S.’ desire to have a partner “not just in the president” but in local Afghan government as well; Spencer Ackerman thinks this reflects the influence of counterinsurgency advocates like John Nagl and Richard Fontaine, who have argued that the Obama administration should focus development efforts at the local level to bypass the Kabul morass.

The days of buying time for a strategy review may be coming to an end. Foreign Policy’s Josh Rogin reports that Richard Holbrooke, et al., are rearranging their schedules to accommodate the rollout, and that “certain embassy representatives” in Washington are to be consulted about the review’s results shortly. McClatchy claims that Obama’s decision will be for 34,000 more troops in Afghanistan, arriving starting next March; according to the Times, the administration has settled on three possible scenarios, with ~34,000 representing the middle option, 40,000 the high ened, and 20-25,000 the minimum. (For what it’s worth, on InTrade, you can get 15:1 odds in favor of a 10,000+ increase being announced before December 31.)

It looks like prospects for a coalition government are dim, as Abdullah’s stance against participating in the government isn’t showing signs of softening. In Abdullah’s first media appearance since withdrawing, he sniped at Karzai’s legitimacy and criticized the IEC for cancelling the runoff, a decision he called “illegal”. He sounds more like an opposition leader than a potential coalition partner, and Steve Coll of the New America Foundation suggests that this is precisely how he wants to be seen in the West: a statesman who can “remain a viable figure in post-Karzai Afghanistan” rather than a “confirmed election loser”. This way, Abdullah has a stronger hand to play when he negotiates for reform–as he puts it, he’ll “act like a pressure group“. Wali Massoud, brother of Ahmad Shah Massoud and an Abdullah supporter, sounds downright happy with the situation: “”We are a force to be reckoned with for any government in this country.”

One Abdullah supporter who seems less enthused about the present situation is Balkh governor Atta Mohammed Noor, who seems determined to make himself the public face of discontentment with Karzai. Writing at the Asia Times, Indian diplomat M K Bhadrakumar argues that Noor’s real issue is with Abdul Rashid Dostum, not Karzai, and that Turkey could make use of its good offices to relax the tension between the two warlords. Nevertheless, Noor is still clamoring for Karzai supporters to be given some number of posts in the new government and making ominous remarks like this: “We do not want to use violence to further our demands — but the people have the right to defend themselves if democratic norms are violated.” So far, however, clashes between Karzai’s supporters and his opponents hae mostly been verbal–like the tiff that shut down the Wolesi Jirga on Thursday, complete with MPs issuing “threats of beating”, according to Pajhwok.

Election fallout aside, two other developments from the past week bear reporting, and both (unsurprisingly) make the task in Afghanistan more coplicated for the U.S. and its allies. First, the U.N. is temporarily removing 600 foreign workers from Afghanistan in the wake of last week’s attack on the guest house that killed several employees. That represents about half of the U.N.’s foreign staff in Kabul, and the fact that the U.N. is establishing an Afghanistan office in Dubai suggests that not all of those people will be returning. Ban Ki-Moon wants $75 million to beef up security in Kabul, possibly for the creation of a fortified compound. As the Center for American Progress’ Brian Katulis points out, this will drastically complicate the “civilian surge” that may or may not be happening, especially since it sends the signal that civilians are the weak underbelly of the international presence in Afghanistan.

The second development is the killing of five British soldiers by a “rogue” Afghan policeman at a checkpoint in Helmand on Wednesday. IWPR investigates his motivations here (note that the Taliban have not claimed responsibility), as well as the reaction of Afghan police and Helmandis to the incident. The shooting made this the deadliest year for British troops since 1982 (Falkland Islands war), and sent shockwaves through the British press at a time when the U.K. is already fairly confused about the nature of its mission in Afghanistan. A former Foreign Office minister responsible for Afghanistan, Kim Howells, called for a pullout from Afghanistan this week and used the incident to cast doubt on the success of the British training mission in Helmand.

Ahmed Wali Karzai

As you know if you read our recent Yale Daily News column, the New York Times reported this week that Ahmed Wali Karzai–younger brother of Hamid, member of Kandahar’s provincial council–has been on the CIA’s payroll for the last eight years. Specifically, the article claims that Karzai:

-Helps the CIA operate a Kandahar paramiltary group

-Allows American special forces to rent a compound outside of Kandahar

-Serves as a go-between when the CIA wants to communicate with the Taliban

Karzai claims that he helps the Americans whenever possible but has “never received any money from any organization”. And of course Karzai continues to respond angrily to allegations that he’s involved in the drug trade. The Times article also cites DEA notes in which informants claim that Karzai has benefited from American operations against Afghan drug lords to take over their business. A “former Afghan Interior Ministry official” also adds that Karzai charges traffickers for the use of bridges over the Helmand River which he controls.

Gerald Posner of the Daily Beast contacts the Karzai brothers and finds them indignant and accusatory: Mahmoud Karzai claims that the report is the doing of the ISI and “far-left” lobbyists. Ahmed says he isn’t worried because no Pashtuns believe the Times anyway, and adds that he thinks this is the Times’ way of trying to influence the election.

The reaction from lawmakers has been cautious but concerned. John Kerry was placed in an awkward spot because he’d just defended Karzai in a speech on Monday, but he now says he has “serious questions” about the information the CIA’s been giving to Congress. John McCain is also angry and says that Ahmed Wali Karzai “should not be in the country”. The White House hasn’t commented.

Of course, as Andrew Exum points out, even if Ahmed Wali Karzai turns out to be completely innocent of drug trafficking and receiving money from the CIA, the fact that “we think that AWK is the CIA’s guy” means that “the Afghans most certainly believe that to be the case”. Joanna Nathan of IWPR adds that this should probably serve as a wakeup call to Americans who like to chastize Hamid Karzai’s government for corruption without realizing that many of our actions–like letting government officials get rich off of our contractors–feed the problem and add to the mistrust among ordinary Afghans. For example, this report from NYU’s Center on International Cooperation catalogues the millions of dollars ISAF has lavished on warlords like Nangarhar governor Gul Agha Sherzai in return for security services. The report lists Hashmat Karzai (another brother) and Defense Minister Hamid Wardak “as powerful figures who control private security firms that have gotten security contracts without registering with the government.”

Karzai re-elected

Should have waited a little longer to post the news summary: the Independent Electoral Commission has declared Hamid Karzai the winner of the presidential election. The November 7th runoff won’t be held after all.

Week in Review, 10/25-11/1

I waited until Sunday night to post this week’s summary for a reason: it was widely reported on Friday and Saturday that Dr. Abdullah was waiting until today to announce his plans not to participate in next week’s runoff election. He didn’t disappoint. Abdullah withdrew from the election without specifically calling for his supporters to boycott the second round–in fact, he said that the mere fact that the runoff had been scheduled had “helped restore the faith of the people in the process”. So it’s not necessarily the case that the runoff will be a complete farce; the Kabul Council of Scholars, for example, is calling on Afghans to vote in the runoff. Whether the runoff will even be held at all, though, is up to the Independent Electoral Commission.

Abdullah and Karzai had been wrangling all week over the details of the second poll, and it’s hard to tell now how much of that was theatrical. Abdullah, for example, wanted the head of the IEC replaced, which Karzai refused to do. (Abdullah’s complaints are not unfounded: as EurasiaNet reports, the IEC still hasn’t explained its failure to fully follow the recommendations of the Electoral Complaints Commission, as it is required to do by law.) That was just one of several signs that the second election won’t be much cleaner than the first; more polling stations will be open, contrary to the UN’s recommendations, for far fewer poll workers, which may add up to even more fraud.

Both Karzai and Abdullah continue to be very clear on their lack of interest in a coalition government. On the other hand, Abdullah didn’t condemn Karzai with as much vitriol as he could have, suggesting to some analysts that “these guys are ready to negotiate”–but we still have no idea what form those negotiations would take.

The fact that Abdullah’s announcement wasn’t unexpected meant that American officials had a head start on doing damage control. Hillary Clinton put a brave face on the news yesterday, claiming that a boycott wouldn’t delegitimize the runoff–a proposition that Juan Cole, among many others, find laughable. (Across the ocean, Gordon Brown had an even cheerier take, saying that Abdullah had pulled out in the interest of national unity.) John Kerry, whose statements on Afghanistan are always parsed as though he were part of the administration, made positive noises about Karzai’s good intentions. Hawks like Joe Lieberman and John Boehner (who don’t want the election fiasco to dissuade Obama from sending more troops) were quick to note (correctly) that Abdullah’s decision probably reflected the fact that he had almost no chance of winning the runoff. For Duncan Hunter (R-CA), this just means that Karzai can now get down to business: “We need a Karzai who isn’t worried about tribal stuff, or infighting, who is not paying anybody off, who is holding people accountable, fighting corruption, putting the right people in the right jobs.” Sounds easy enough…

Many news outlets paired reports on the dispiriting state of the elections with the story of the first prominent resignation over the war. Says the Washington Post:

A former Marine Corps captain with combat experience in Iraq, Hoh had also served in uniform at the Pentagon, and as a civilian in Iraq and at the State Department. By July, he was the senior U.S. civilian in Zabul province, a Taliban hotbed.

Hoh is very clear about the nature of his protest: it’s about the war’s ends, not its means. He also goes out of way to deny that he’s a “peacenik”, and he agrees that “we have some obligation for [Afghanistan] not to be a bloodbath, so he’s not calling for a precipitous pullout. His main concerns are that our presence in Afghanistan is fueling resentment among Pashtuns, and therefore driving the insurgency, and that the Karzai government isn’t an adequate partner. It sounds like the August elections reinforced his opinions; his resignation came before Abdullah’s announcement.

Hoh’s higher-ups didn’t take his resignation sitting down. Hoh had face-to-face meetings with both Richard Holbrooke and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, both of whom apparently offered him jobs in an attempt to dissuade him from resigning. A meeting with Biden is apparently also in Hoh’s future. No doubt Holbrooke and Eikenberry realized that skeptics of the war would seize on Hoh’s resignation as proof of the futility of counterinsurgency. The Carnegie Endowment’s Gilles Dorronsoro, for example has a few quibbles with Hoh’s broader strategic points but thinks he’s raising the right questions about the situation on the ground. Spencer Ackerman (not necessarily a war skeptic) also adds that Robert Gates, among others, have previously voiced Hoh’s concern that resentment at our presence is a major driver of the insurgency.

Naturally, counterinsurgency enthusiasts are frustrated that the views of one officer, even a well-respected one, are getting the public attention denied to thousands who disagree. Which is a fair point, but the flip side of this phenomenon, I think, is that–except when they make a splash like Hoh did–skeptics of the war are routinely ignored and marginalized. More gravely, Andrew Exum notes that Hoh was NOT actually a “foreign service officer” as the Post reported. Instead, as a WaPo commenter explains, Hoh was a “3161″ State Department employee, “a special category of temporary appointments brought on for 12 month assignments in certain areas of expertise”. That’s not the same as being a career diplomat. It doesn’t invalidate Hoh’s critique, of course, but the magnitude of the resignation should be kept in perspective. At the very least, though, Hoh should shatter the complacency of people like Duncan Hunter, who said this in the same interview I quoted above: “Everybody seems very confident, very excited. Everybody thinks that they can win it, we can win it, we can hand it over to the Afghans, and we can get out of there.” I hope Hoh’s message gives him at least a little pause.

Even if we’re actually close to “handing it over to the Afghans”, in the mean time Western forces are still in Afghanistan and still under assault. Eight U.S. troops died in attacks on armored vehicles in southern Afghanistan on Tuesday; combined with the deaths of eleven servicemen (and several civilians) in two unlinked helicopter crashes on Monday, this made October the deadliest month for American troops in Afghanistan, with 55 fatalities. The violence was felt even outside of the insurgent-riddled South this week, when a two-hour siege at a guesthouse in Kabul left eight dead, five of whom were UN employees. The perpetrators were apparently members of the Haqqani network from Pakistan’s Swat Valley, in cooperation with an Al Qaeda operative, and the attack is widely being interpreted as the Taliban’s first attempt to make good on their promise to disrupt the runoff elections. The attack was accompanied by rocket attacks on the presidential palace and a nearby luxury hotel popular among Western journalists. Afghanistan’s intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, said that the “ringleader” of the attack was arrested by Saudi officials on Saturday. Meanwhile, the UN is unhappy with the slow response of the Afghan Police, who only arrived on the scene after the fighting (with UN security guards) was over.

The “Civilian Surge”

I’ve accumulated several items about the “civilian surge” (or lack thereof) that I’ve meant to post for a while now. Fortunately (not really), not much seems to be happening on that front.

The first is a post at World Politics Review by the excellent David Axe [EDIT: It was actually Andrew Bast. Axe, however, wrote a similar piece at WPR focusing on medical assistance in Afghanistan. I meant to link to both and somehow conflated them.]  Bast’s theme is the increasing shortfall in diplomats for Afghanistan, part of the broader difficulty the State Department is encountering in filling its “hardship positions” around the globe. State can’t deploy diplomats against their will, unlike the military, and the hardship posts get harder every year. What’s worse, even State’s recent hiring spree might not solve the problem–as Bast says, “an onslaught of new hires will do little to remedy the emerging shortage of mid-career, experienced professionals.”

The Times reports that 575 of the year-end target of 974 aid workers are currently on the ground in Afghanistan. That’s not a great ratio, but the good news is that Obama’s paying attention to the problem–or so says a “senior official”. Unfortunately, “senior officials” also say that the “military [is] likely to do much of the civilian work in the foreseeable future, at least until Afghanistan is more secure.” If that’s so, what’s the best-case scenario for the civilian surge? Is showering aid and expertise on Kabul (and a few other secure areas) the way to go?

The Kabul question is what worries Spencer Ackerman. Our advisers are all holed up in Kabul at the same time that COIN proponents like CNAS’ John Nagl are recommending that we focus on local improvements as a kind of end-run around the corrupt and weakly legitimate Karzai government. If we don’t have the capacity to do that, Ackerman wonders, then what of McChrystal’s warning that “ISAF cannot succeed without a corresponding cadre of civilian experts to support the change in strategy and capitalize on the expansion and acceleration of counterinsurgency efforts”?

In The New Republic, Steven Metz has a simple answer: it won’t happen. The military, he writes, is so desperate to “off-load nation building” that it’s convinced itself that the civilian surge is a done deal–but every report on Afghanistan for five years has included the same call for increased civilian capacity, and it hasn’t happened. “We would need many thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of advisers with linguistic skills and cultural knowledge willing to leave home and live under risky conditions for years at a time.” That doesn’t look like it’s in the cards, so we’re left with a question analogous to those being asked about the troop surge: would a few hundred aid workers (or a few thousand troops) be a drop in the bucket in a country as large and diverse as Afghanistan?

Human Rights and Afghanistan

On Tuesday, 10/27, Habib Rahiab joined us as the first outside guest in YAF’s fall speaker series. Mr. Rahiab is a human rights activist who was forced to flee Afghanistan because of his work documenting human rights abuses and advocating that Afghan warlords implicated in past war crimes be brought to justice. He led Human Rights Watch projects to interview victims and prepare reports drawing attention to these issues (his report “Killing You Is a Very Easy Thing For Us To Do” is here), and he now works with the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center in New Haven.

Mr, Rahiab spoke about his personal struggles growing up in Afghanistan, witnessing the atrocities committed by the Communist regime, the mujahideen and the Taliban, and how these experiences influenced him to become a human rights activist.

After the fall of the Taliban, some of his early work involved gathering testimony from Afghan and Pakistani ex-detainees from Guantanamo, Bagram and black-site prisons. He described the terrible psychological state of these men, and his disbelief upon first hearing stories of sexual abuse.

Peace Before Justice?

Mr. Rahiab described how the international coalition’s choice to have a “light footprint” in Afghanistan influenced the developments of the last eight years. The overall presence was small, compared to post-conflict situations such as Bosnia and East Timor, and responsibilities were divided among many nations. The decision was made to focus on peace rather than justice, overlooking past atrocities in the interests of security and a quick withdrawal.

Along with the failure to build state institutions came the failure to create economic development. Mr Rahiab recounted how, when expectations were high, Iranians joked that they would have to migrate to Afghanistan for jobs, instead of the other way around. However, people now find it easier to make a living by joining the Taliban. The insurgency can promise money in this life, and heaven in the next, while the government can promise neither.

On Security Forces:

Asked whether he was concerned about abuses in the Afghan security forces, he said that, while corruption and incapacity are widespread, there is respect for the official forces, and that they do not pose the human rights issues that private militias do.

The use of private security by international groups is also a serious problem. It undermines structures of accountability and creates inequality in protection. It is fundamentally unjust when private contractors turn a blind eye to robberies taking place around them because only foreigners can pay to guard their property.

On the Current Decisions to Be Made:

Mr. Rabiab supports holding the run-off election. The election is important not for Karzai’s legitimacy, but the legitimacy of the democratic project. Something must be done to restore faith in elections as a system after the fraudulent first round of voting.

His suggestion for today is to focus the most money on the provinces that are stable enough for it to do some good. If Kabul were a model of order and prosperity, it would demonstrate an incentive to stop fighting the government. As it is, people in the north and center of the country feel like they should set off bombs in order to get attention and development.

On the Shia Family Law

The question period ended with a discussion of the Shia family law, which came under fire last year for legalizing marital rape. According to Mr. Rabiab, the law must be seen in the context of the political maneuvering surrounding the election. It was drafted by the most conservative clerics, and is not representative of the actual lived rights of Shia women. However, it enjoys broad support because for the first time the law establishes Shia as an official religion. Hazara generally defend the government because they have the most to gain from the new system.

Our deep thanks to Mr. Rahiab, and to everyone who attended.

Yale Daily News Op-Ed

http://www.yaledailynews.com/opinion/guest-columns/2009/10/28/mayersohn-and-oye-democracy-and-afghanistan/

Check out our thoughts on the recent presidential elections and their implications for the country’s future and for the American mission in Afghanistan.

Week in Review, 10/18-10/24

As everyone is no doubt aware, President Karzai was stripped of his outright election win this week, triggering a runoff to be held November 7. Let’s take a look at the sequence of events that got us to this point.

Sunday

The Electoral Complaints Commission reports its findings to the Independent Electoral Commission, the body responsible for certifying the elections. The ECC rejects the results from 2100 polling stations, eliminating 1.25 million votes and leaving Karzai with 49.7% of the vote, short of the 50%+1 needed to avoid a second round.

Tuesday

The IEC announces the date for the runoff election. President Karzai accepts the IEC’s decision–grudgingly–after a two-hour meeting with Senator John Kerry and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. Kerry was in the neighborhood to meet with Pakistani leaders, and added a stopover in Kabul as an apparent afterthought. Dexter Filkins of the Times has credited Kerry’s “relentless efforts” for Karzai’s decision to accept the ECC’s findings; the fact that the U.S. isn’t yet committed to a troop surge apparently provided him with an important piece of leverage, since he can hold the threat of withdrawal over Karzai’s head. Note that Kerry has been very careful to specify that he has not discussed the option of a coalition government, which he says would be an “inappropriate” topic.

Karzai proceeds to initiate emergency preparations for the new poll.

Wednesday

President Karzai announces that he will take part in the runoff election. Representatives of the ISAF nations are quick to congratulate him on what Gordon Brown referred to as a “statesmanlike” move. (Brown spoke with Karzai three times in the 48 hours preceding Karzai’s decision, according to the Telegraph.)

Dr. Abdullah speaks with Karzai, reportedly for the first time since August. Abdullah has continued to maintain that he has no interest in joining a coalition government. Karzai has taken a hard line against negotiating before the runoff but remains open to the idea of a coalition government. This may reflect the fact that Karzai still holds the better cards, as I mentioned last week, because even after the shut-down of several hundred “ghost” polling stations, he’s still in a very good position to prevail in the runoff.

Dr. Abdullah agrees to participate in the second round–with certain conditions. He says that a re-run under conditions similar to August’s will not be acceptable. The U.N. announces that several hundred poll officials “complicit” in fraud will be removed before November 7, which means that the total number of Afghan poll officials will be greatly reduced. (They have less to oversee, since there aren’t any local elections this time around.)

Abdullah, however, seems to be holding out for the removal of several pro-Karzai members from the IEC. For its part, the IEC has already begun to suggest that the demands of Abdullah and international observers–increased transparency, etc.–can’t realistically be met under war conditions.

President Obama hints that a decision on troop levels will wait until the runoff takes place. Senator Kerry enthusiastically endorses the idea. Last week’s meeting of NATO defense ministers in Bratislava came out with a strong statement endorsing General McChrystal’s intensive counterinsurgency strategy–a policy heavily promoted by NATO head Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

Thursday

Kai Eide echoes the NATO call for stepped-up counterinsurgency. (Eide also got in one more parting shot against Peter Galbraith, even though Galbraith looks pretty prescient right about now.) Meanwhile, though, member countries (like Denmark and the Netherlands) clarify that their decision won’t come before the runoff election.

Friday

Obama discusses the election results with Ambassador Eikenberry, but the White House is very quiet about their conclusions. Administration officials have been adamant about not setting a date for the release of the new strategy, even in the face of mounting Republican pressure as well as rising frustration from segments of the military. It’s hard to know how much to make of quotes like the ones in the Times story I linked there, but quotes like this from Obama aren’t going to improve the situation: “I think it is entirely possible that we have a strategy formulated before a runoff is determined. We may not announce it.” Okay.

Saturday and Sunday

Campaigning begins across the country. Pajhwok reports a gathering of 1,000+ tribal elders in Jalalabad in support of Karzai. More troublingly, Kabul University students protest the foreign presence in Afghanistan, apparently in response to the rumor that American troops burnt a Koran. Check out this picture of a protest banner, from Radio Liberty: “No Democracy, We Just Want Islam”. In English, in case there was any doubt about the intended target.

So what will a second round actually look like? Unsurprisingly, the international community is falling all over itself to declare its optimism. Richard Holbrooke declared himself confident that the runoff would have “fewer irregularities”. (Speaking of Holbrooke, McClatchy wants to know: where was he while Kerry was jawboning Karzai?) U.N. Envoy Kai Eide made the same point more cautiously, choosing to emphasize the inevitability of fraud while maintaining that the level would be reduced.

It’s also clear that some policymakers are hedging their bets, hinting that the United States may double down in Afghanistan even with a fraud-tainted government–see, for example, Secretary Gates’ recent remarks, which attempt to distinguish the broader issue of legitimacy from the election results. (A fair point, in my opinion, but one that may not sway skeptics in Congress.)

And what about the result? I’ve only seen a few analysts suggesting that it will be radically different from the first vote. Pajhwok interviews Michael Kugelman of the Woodrow Wilson Center, who argues that the jury-rigged security measures and fickle non-Pashtun warlords could cost Karzai dearly, perhaps threatening his reelection. But Fareed Zakaria was more typical in dismissing Abdullah’s chances out of hand; a good showing by Abdullah would only be significant, he claims, in that it might pressure Karzai to include him in the government. Agence-France Presse reports on one potential wildcard: MP Ramazan Bashardost, who received 10.5% of the final tally and is still mulling what to instruct his supporters.

Unsurprisingly, the Taliban have promised a new wave of violence to accompany the runoff poll. We’ll see how the threat of violence, combined with the onset of winter, affect turnout; Pajhwok, for one, takes a cheerful perspective, finding a number of voters who skipped the first round but plan to vote in the second. But delivering seventeen million ballots to six thousand polling stations in such a short time still strikes me as phenomenally daunting.

Finally, rather than speculating on the Afghan perspective to the runoff, I’ll direct you to this post from the Afghanistan Analysts Network, and this article from The National, with a variety of reactions from around the country. Shortly I hope to post a round-up of commentary on what the week’s events imply for the United States.

ECC ruling leaves Karzai under 50%

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8314613.stm

Everyone will see this soon enough, but I thought I’d post it anyway.